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Formal Justice and Judicial
Precedent*
David Lyons**
Despite the encroachment of legislation on matters that used
to lie within the province of the common law, considerable scope
remains for the judicial practice of following precedent, without
challenging the authority of written law. For decisions must still be
rendered where legislation has not yet intervened, and interpretations of written law can be accorded precedential force.
Why should courts follow precedents? When past decisions are
unobjectionable on their merits, the practice is relatively unproblematic. It might, perhaps, be justified by the usual argument
that it makes judicial decisions more predictable. That justification
hardly seems, however, to confront the fact that precedents may
have been unfortunate, unwise, and unjust. Why should courts
show any respect at all to such decisions?
This Article concerns an argument which, if sound, would support a doctrine of precedent with unlimited scope-one that would
provide some justification, though not overwhelming justification,
for following all precedents, however regrettable they may be. The
argument holds that respect for precedent is required by the principle that like cases should be treated alike.
Although that argument is challenged here, no claim is made
that a practice of precedent cannot be justified. The larger purpose
of this Article is to clear the way for a systematic inquiry into the
sound reasons for, as well as the legitimate scope of, such a
practice.
The argument to be examined is sketched in section I. Section
* An earlier version of this paper was published as Lyons, Formal Justice, Moral
Commitment, and JudicialPrecedent,81 J. PHILos. 580 (1984). Material from that paper is
used here with permission of The Journalof Philosophy.The author would like to express
his thanks for comments on the earlier version from Thomas Scanlon and other participants
in the American Philosophical Association symposium in which it was presented; from those
who commented when it was presented at the University of Utah; and from Sterling
Harwood. Research for and writing of this paper were supported in part by a Constitutional
Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
** Professor of Law and Philosophy, Cornell University.
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II takes up the notion of following precedent, to show both that it
is not empty but also that it can be understood in more than one
way. Section III considers one interpretation of the idea that like
cases should be treated alike, as a "formal" principle, which leaves
the doctrine of precedent unsupported. Section IV considers another interpretation of the idea, the requirement of moral consistency, which is inadequate to validate the argument, but for different reasons. Section V considers some other grounds for the
practice of precedent.
I.

THE FORMAL JUSTICE ARGUMENT

The reason most often given for the practice of precedent is
that it increases the predictability of judicial decisions. As a consequence, it increases security, minimizes risks that might otherwise
discourage useful ventures, and generally avoids frustrating
expectations.
One might quibble with this line of reasoning. It is unclear, for
example, that expectations that might be frustrated by the failure
to follow past decisions would even be formed, unless there already
existed a more or less regular practice of following precedent. But
quibbles like that do not undermine the other claims made on behalf of predictability. These are plausible claims that I do not wish
to challenge. Their implications, however, are limited, considered
merely on their own terms.
Arguments like these refer to benefits supposedly brought
about by the practice of precedent, and such benefits depend on
variable circumstances. Even under the most favorable conditions,
following precedent can have disadvantages too, if only for those
who lose out in court. So the point of these arguments must be
that following precedent does more good than harm, overall.
Clearly, following an unwise or unfortunate precedent can
sometimes do more harm than good. The same applies to the general practice, at least within a given jurisdiction over an extended
period of time. The possibility cannot be ruled out a priori. Such
reasons for the practice therefore seem incapable of endorsing it in
all circumstances, under all conditions. So far as this sort of argument is concerned, the practice can sometimes lack justification.
To clarify this point, we must distinguish between the limited
scope and the limited weight that a principle or doctrine might
have. Principles are rarely regarded as "absolute"; it is understood
that they can be overridden in some circumstances. Such principles can be said to have limited weight. A principle's scope is its
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legitimate sphere of application, which is different from, and
largely independent of, its weight.
A principle prescribing that judicial precedents be followed
might have unlimited scope but limited weight. This is suggested
when a case to be decided should be distinguished from a precedent because of overriding differences between the two-when the
significance of the differences is not determined by precedents
alone. Then the principle would seem to argue for following the
precedent because of its similarities to the case to be decided, but
it is overridden by whatever considerations argue for different
treatment of the case. This gives no reason to conclude that the
principle has limited scope, though it must have limited weight.
Consider the role of precedent within the widening sphere of
legislation. Where legislation has intervened, it is generally understood to take priority over previous case law. But this is compatible with the idea that the applicable principle of precedent is overridden by the doctrine of legislative supremacy. The point of
understanding the principle as applicable within the context of legislation is that it would still be relevant to interpretive decisions.
The principle would prescribe that past interpretations of statutes
be followed-always, presumably, with the qualification "other
things being equal," which represents its limited weight.
This suggests one reason for the importance of the notion that
respect for precedent is a matter of treating like cases alike. The
principle that like cases should be treated alike is assumed to have
unlimited scope. Any reason it provides for the practice of precedent would hold for all situations in which precedents are
available.
A second reason for the importance of that argument is that
treating like cases alike is often regarded as a requirement, indeed
perhaps the central or most fundamental requirement, of justice.'
When so viewed, the practice of precedent is placed on a moral
footing. It implies that the failure to follow precedent is not merely
unwise but positively wrong-"other things being equal," that is,
unless the failure can be justified by circumstances that permit an
injustice to be done.
The standard argument for the practice of precedent, by contrast, has more problematic moral status. While it may be a good
thing, by and large, for officials to promote benefits and minimize
burdens by making judicial decisions more predictable, it is control. A good source for this view is H.LA

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-56 (1961).
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versial whether this is always morally permissible, even other
things being equal. It may be held, for example, that justice takes
priority over this kind of utility, so that benefits should be promoted only on the condition that they be distributed fairly. A
practice that merely perpetuated social injustice would be morally
problematic.
This is particularly important if we suppose that a principle of
precedent has unlimited scope-or at least includes among the
precedents to be followed those that are morally deficient as well
as those that are unproblematic. Regarding the principle that like
cases should be treated alike as a principle of justice implies moral
grounds for respecting flawed precedents.
The idea that there might be moral grounds for respecting
morally deficient aspects of a legal system is not implausible, and
it is often embraced. It is not implausible because it would merely
represent the hard moral fact that principles often seem to conflict.
It is embraced, for example, when it is held that there can be a
general moral obligation to obey the law (incumbent more strongly,
perhaps, on officials than on private citizens), which applies, at
least sometimes, to bad as well as good law.
I shall call the idea that the practice of precedent respects the
requirement that like cases be treated alike, the formal justice argument, because its premise, for reasons we shall later consider, is
usually regarded as "formal."
One finds the formal justice argument suggested in the jurisprudential literature.2 It is not developed or discussed extensively,
perhaps because the inference from premise to conclusion seems so
simple and direct that elaboration is unnecessary. The idea seems
to be this: the requirement that like cases be treated alike is understood to imply that, once we have dealt with a situation in a
certain way, it is incumbent on us, other things being equal, to deal
with similar situations in similar ways. From this it may seem a
simple short step to a principle of judicial precedent, because the
latter may seem just a specific case of the requirement that we follow our past practice generally.
II.

FOLLOWING PRECEDENT

One aspect of the formal justice argument needs to be considered first: both the premise and the conclusion incorporate the
2. See, e.g., M. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING
ING AND LEGAL THEORY 73ff (1978).

98 (1984); N. MACCORMICK,

LEGAL REASON-
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problematic notion of a "like" or "similar" case. The "cases" referred to by the conclusion are those decided in a court of law,
whereas the class of "cases" covered by the premise must be much
broader, including, perhaps, any situation in which one might form
a judgment and act accordingly. We can limit our attention just
now to the narrower class of cases, for that will enable us to focus
at once on the idea of following precedent. The problem concerning "similar cases" in the broader sphere is basically the same.
The basic problem is simple. Take any case that is to be decided and any other case that has already been decided. However
similar they may be, in respects that may seem important, they
will also be different in some respects, and vice versa. Some general
facts about one case will be general facts about the other, and some
general facts about one case will not be general facts about the
other. So objective grounds exist both for and against regarding
any past case as "similar" to one that is to be decided.
As a consequence, a principle prescribing that decisions follow
those that have already been made in "similar cases" can seem literally impossible to follow. If all the factual aspects of cases were
relevant, and any similarity and any difference between cases were
sufficient to make them similar and different, respectively, then
each past case would both be and not be a precedent for any case
to be decided. On that interpretation, the principle would be impossible to follow because it would be, strictly speaking,
incoherent.
This conclusion can be avoided only by limiting the range of
cases that can be counted as "similar" to, and thus as precedents
for, a case to be decided. But, it might be argued, any limitation of
that sort would deliberately ignore objective similarities between
the case to be decided and those that are excluded from the class
of precedents, as well as objective differences between the former
and those included in the class of precedents. For this reason, any
interpretation of the principle of precedent that avoids incoherence might be considered inherently arbitrary.
Consequently, it might be thought that the very idea of precedent, and along with it that of following precedent, is inherently
unclear, so that we need not worry about the logic of the formal
justice argument; for its conclusion could make no determinate difference to judicial practice. Courts might speak of "following prior
decisions in similar cases," and the like, but any actual use of
precedents would be either confused or arbitrary.
A solution to this problem depends on the possibility of a
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nonarbitrary distinction between similarities among cases that are
relevant and those that are irrelevant to the practice of precedent.
I argue in this section that a nonarbitrary distinction seems available, though there is more than one way of understanding both the
distinction and the doctrine of precedent.
Let us begin with what seems the most natural and straightforward way of understanding the practice of precedent, one that
also seems to conform to the intention of the formal justice argument. The premise of that argument is understood to require that
we continue generally to deal with cases as we have been doing,
and the conclusion is understood to require that we continue specifically to decide legal cases as we have been doing.
The most natural way of understanding this in the judicial
realm is in terms of following the legal judgment that is represented by a previous court decision. Suppose that a court has decided a case by regarding some of its factual aspects as grounds for
certain legal consequences. Call these the grounding aspects of the
case. That case would seem to count as a precedent for another
when the latter case has factual aspects that are the same as
grounding aspects of the former case. For the purpose of following
precedent, these similarities between the two cases are relevant,
and no others are relevant-though other aspects of the cases
might of course be relevant for other judicial purposes.
This elementary idea enables us to say what it is to follow precedent in a relatively simple situation. Suppose that all the
grounding aspects of the precedent are also factual aspects of the
case to be decided. The cases might otherwise be very different. To
follow that precedent, the court deciding the later case would simply decide the issue in the same way the earlier one was decided.
Before going further, it may be useful to note how this approach to understanding the practice of precedent applies to past
decisions that have interpreted written law. Suppose that a given
text has been construed by a court. In arriving at its reading, the
court may have formed a judgment concerning the determinate relevance of such things as the specific wording of the text, the specific type of text it is, its legal origins, its proposed applications,
and so on. To form such a judgment is, in effect, to regard certain
factual aspects of a case as grounds for certain legal consequences,
where the consequences concern the specific meaning to be attached to the text and its acknowledged legal ramifications. To follow an interpretational precedent amounts to following a court's
judgment as to the legal difference such factors make to the read-
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ing of a text.
Now I do not mean to suggest that is generally easy to identify
and follow a precedent, so understood. The past court's legal judgment may be unclear; it might never have been clear, even to that
court. So it may be impossible, in principle as well as in practice,
to follow the legal judgments represented by some past decisions,
even though the cases might reasonably seem quite similar to the
one that is to be decided. But these difficulties give us no reason to
suppose that it is never possible faithfully to follow prior decisions
in similar cases. A court can have had determinate grounds for its
decision, and there can be adequate evidence of it now. This means
that a principle of precedent, on this natural reading, can have determinate implications for practice.
The complications should not be underestimated. Precedents
are not usually so perfectly "on point." Suppose that some, but not
all, of the grounding aspects of a precedent are factual aspects of a
case to be decided. On the present conception of the practice, there
is in principle a way to follow that precedent if, but only if, the
court that decided it regarded that proper subset of grounding aspects as sufficient grounds for certain legal consequences. To follow
that precedent, the court deciding the later case would attach
those consequences to the relevant factual aspects of it and decide
it accordingly. Any other way of deciding the case would not
amount to following precedent, on this conception.
As matters become even so slightly more complicated, it is
clear that precedents become increasingly difficult to follow. The
court that decided the earlier case may have formed no legal judgment concerning the significance of the relevant proper subset of
factual conditions; for it might not have needed to do so. Even if it
did so, it might not have expressed that judgment clearly. This is
just the beginning of the complications.
Perhaps the most serious difficulty for the practice of precedent is the incidence of conflicting precedents-past decisions that
provide, in effect, incompatible guidance for a judicial decision.
Two similar cases might have been decided differently, so that the
precedents conflict most directly, or the case to be decided might
have aspects in common with each of two past cases while those
cases share no relevant aspects. Either way, while it may be possible to follow each precedent, it will be impossible to follow all
precedents.
Because it is impossible to follow all precedents, a reasonable
doctrine of precedent would not require courts always to follow all
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precedents for a given case. But we cannot say, a priori,what more
specific guidance a reasonable doctrine would provide for such a
case. That presumably depends, most importantly, on what
grounds there are for following precedents and how those grounds
may be implicated when precedents conflict.
. While the possibility of conflicting precedents tells us that
they can not always be followed, other factors are taken as reasons
why precedents should not always be followed. We have already
noted two such reasons: intervening legislation and differences that
are taken as justifying differential disposition. Such complications
make it difficult to say when, precisely, precedent should be followed. But they do not suggest that the very notion of following
precedent is inherently unclear. They indicate rather the need to
become clear about possible justifications for the practice.
Before we consider the formal justice argument in that role,
we should note that the practice of precedent can be understood
quite differently. In either describing or endorsing the practice, one
might not conceive of it in terms of faithfully following a past
court's legal judgment. One might hold, for example, that the justifiable use of past decisions as determinate points of departure for
current ones involves construing them in the best light possible.
One would seek to determine whether, and if so how, past decisions could have been justified; only such decisions would be assumed to merit subsequent respect. The precedential import of a
justifiable past decision would be given by the standards, such as
the principles or other values, that provide the best justification
for it. A past case would constitute a precedent for a new case
when at least some of the standards so identified can be applied to
the current case.' The notion of justification that is employed in
this conception of the practice requires clarification, but I shall defer comment until later. For now it may be noted that, if the criteria of justification can be fixed, then the idea of following precedent has determinate implications for judicial decision under this
interpretation too. I do not mean that it would generally be easy or
always possible to apply such a conception. Just as courts in some
past cases may have failed to form a relevant and clear legal judgment, so courts have rendered decisions that cannot be justified.
Such cases could not serve as precedents under the two respective
conceptions of the practice.
3. This approach to precedent is discussed in D.
92-104 (1984).

LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW
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We might call these two conceptions the historical and the
normative, respectively. The normative conception might seem
problematical because its use involves recourse to value judgments,
which are not required under the historical conception. Any discomfort with that fact must stem from the notion that courts may
not legitimately employ value judgments, even when interpreting
precedents, rather than from skepticism about value judgments
themselves. For one who inquires into the possible justification of
such doctrines as judicial precedent must assume that value judgments are differentially defensible-that they are not inherently
arbitrary.
It may turn out that the various attempts that have been
made to characterize and justify the practice of precedent can be
understood as modeled on either or both of these two conceptions,
emphasizing either fidelity to the legal judgments that courts have
already in fact embraced, or fidelity to past practice only insofar
as, and in the respects in which it is, justifiable.
III.

FORMAL JUSTICE AS A FRAMEWORK

We turn now to the premise of the formal justice argument
and begin with the problem of "similar cases." For reasons already
noted, it could be held that the principle requiring that like cases
be treated alike is impossible to follow or else can be followed only
in an arbitrary manner. Until it is supplemented by "criteria of
relevant similarities," it "cannot afford any determinate guide to
conduct.""
The question that we face, then, is whether the principle has
any interpretation that would solve this problem and render the
argument sound. Two different approaches to its interpretation are
in fact available. On the view we shall consider in this section, the
words "treat like cases alike" express only the bare "form" of principles of justice and no determinate content. In the next section we
will examine a determinate interpretation that has been placed on
those words.
We can understand the first approach as follows. Justice requires certain patterns of dealing with situations. That is what the
concept of justice involves. But this concept is subject to many different interpretations, some of which are incompatible with others.
These are specific conceptions of justice-different theories of
4. See H.LA

HART,

supra note 1, at 155.
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what justice requires and allows.5 A coherent egalitarian conception of justice, for example, would tell us that all people should be
treated alike in certain determinate respects (for it would be impossible to treat everyone alike in all respects). Nonegalitarian
conceptions would emphasize that we should "treat different cases
differenty"-a formula that is usually thought to complement the
requirement that like cases be treated alike-but they would also
tell us, in effect, which cases are to be treated alike.
One merit of such a view concerning not only justice but also
other broad moral concepts is that something very much like it
seems needed to account for some important facts about morality.
For example, two individuals who do not seem conceptually confused-who seem to have no difficulty manipulating the concept of
justice, and who do not seem to be talking at cross purposes-can
disagree about what justice fundamentally requires and allows.
This appearance would be illusory unless something like the concept-conception distinction were applicable.
The plausibility of the distinction is suggested, moreover, by
its applicability to a much wider range of concepts, not all of them
normative. Something like it is needed to explain, for example,
how scientists can develop increasingly accurate conceptions of a
natural phenomenon under a fairly constant concept. The concept
of heat does not tell us what heat fundamentally is, but the concept admits of various conceptions. The caloric conception, which
regarded heat as a substance with negative mass, gave way for
good reason to the current conception-of heat as the mean kinetic
energy of molecules. One such conception can be an improvement
over another only if the concept of heat retains a fairly constant
reference, independent of the competing conceptions under it.
The example of heat suggests how the superiority of one conception over another is determined by factors that go beyond concepts alone, such as the objective facts. If there are better and
worse conceptions of justice, that will not be determined by the
bare concept. But the analogy with heat is not meant to imply that
there must be superior and inferior conceptions of justice, no less
that the matter must be determined by objective facts. We cannot
rule out that possibility, but neither can we rule out the possibility
that there are a number of equally valid, though competing, conceptions, none of which is best. That question is left open by the
application of the concept-conception distinction. In the original
5. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A

THEORY Op JUSTcE

5-6 (1971).
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terms, the fact that definite criteria of similarities that are relevant
for the purpose of doing justice are required if justice is to have
determinate requirements does not imply that such criteria are objectively determined. That question is left open by our recognition
of the need for such criteria.
The formal justice argument does not leave such matters open.
The argument assumes that some ways of acting are just and that
others are unjust, so it presupposes that there are significant limits on admissible conceptions of justice. But it does not tell us
what those limits are, nor on this reading does it identify any general conception of justice. All the argument tells us, in effect, is
that whatever those limits may be, they insure that the practice of
judicial precedent is a matter of treating like cases alike in a way
that justice more generally requires.
To put the matter differently, the formal justice argument
presupposes that criteria of relevant similarities among cases to be
treated alike are not inherently arbitrary but are discoverable. But,
on the present reading, the formal justice argument gives us absolutely no reason to believe what it claims about the practice of precedent. If we regard the premise of the argument as "formal," in
this first sense, then the argument as a whole amounts to a framework waiting for substantiation.
What needs to be shown is that there is a reason, grounded
upon justice or something else, for following past decisions even
when they were brutally inhumane and outrageously unjust. That
seems on its face a dubious proposition, and the formal justice argument has not yet been found to give us any reason to believe it
to be true.
IV.

CONSISTENCY AND CONSERVATIVISM

A formal justice reason may seem to be provided by the second approach to understanding the requirement that like cases be
treated alike, which holds that it has determinate, even if minimal
and only "formal," implications. On this view the premise is regarded as "formal" not because it amounts to a mere framework
without substantive implications, but because it is thought to re6
present a logical constraint of moral consistency.
Consistency, in this sense, involves the logical compatibility of
beliefs or judgments, and not, for example, their truth, wisdom, or
justifiability. In the present context, it concerns the logical com6. This is suggested by both Golding and MacCormick. See supra note 2.
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patibility of one's moral judgments, such as the way in which one
judges acts or other things at different times and in different
situations.
It is quite plausible to suppose that logic constrains moral
judgment in this way, for one's judgments are not completely independent of one another. They have implications that might be contradicted either directly or indirectly by other judgments. Most
important here, one's judgment of specific cases, such as individual
acts performed by oneself or others, often reflect general standards. One's judgments are not all ad hoc. This can be true even
when one does not consciously deliberate when forming a moral
judgment. One can simply have a disposition to appraise certain
sorts of situations in certain ways, a disposition that is exemplified
in judgments that one makes about specific cases. That would
seem indeed to be a psychological platitude.
We can understand this in the following way. Moral judgments, as opposed to mere visceral reactions that can be expressed
in words, presuppose some general standards. That is because a
judgment is predicated on the idea that relevant facts in the case
ground one's judgment of it. But to believe that certain facts are
relevant in a certain way in one case is to believe that the same
facts are relevant in the same way in other cases, other things being equal. One need not be able to articulate one's standards on
demand. The point is that in making a judgment one is committed
to the idea that it can be grounded in some way on the facts, and
this commits one to the view that such facts are similarly relevant
in similar cases, the relevant similarities being determined by the
standards that one applies. Thus consistency requires one to "treat
like cases alike."
It is important to appreciate that no part of the constraint of
moral consistency or such presuppositions of its applicability as we
have considered makes use of the notion of a uniquely true, correct, or sound moral judgment. This minimal constraint concerns
merely how one's judgments, both specific and general, hang together. And yet this constraint has some determinate implications.
It says, in effect, that one must apply the same standards to all
cases that one is not honestly prepared to distinguish on principled
grounds. That does not tell us what cases to distinguish or more
generally what principles to apply. But it does tell us to be faithful
to our own deepest values, whatever they may be, and to judge
specific matters accordingly.
There is some point to all of this; for we are not implacably
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consistent in our judgments. Despite our deepest moral beliefs,
there are times when we are inclined to judge some acts or persons
either more indulgently or more severely than others, without any
grounds that we would acknowledge honestly. One may be too forgiving of a loved one's weakness or of one's own predicament, or
one may be exceptionally demanding of oneself or of those to
whom one is intimately related. One may judge strangers too
harshly or bend over backwards not to do so. The constraint of
consistency is meant to counsel against such deviations from one's
own general standards.
The result of a violation is not an injustice but that sort of
incoherence of which one is guilty whenever one's beliefs or judgments are incompatible. Of course, there may be more to a violation than that, as when one tries to deceive oneself or others into
judging in a way one could not honestly endorse.
It is easy to see how this constraint may be thought to require
that we go on as before, at least in our judging. Unless we have
genuinely modified our moral commitments, consistency requires
that we apply them to new cases that arise, whether or not we like
the results of doing so.
The requirement that one continue judging as before is parallel to the historical conception of following precedent. If a doctrine
of precedent adds anything to the requirement of consistency in
judgment, it may seem to be merely the requirement of a closely
related kind of consistency-of one's actions with one's honest
judgments. For the doctrine of precedent requires not only that
one judge, in the narrow sense of forming a judgment, consistently,
but also that one act accordingly-consistently with one's judgment. Both elements are of course included in the complex notion
of judicial decision.
Thus, the requirement that like cases be treated alike, when
understood as expressing the constraint of consistency in judgment, may seem like adequate support for a principle of precedent
on the historical model. Consistency requires that we go on as
before, and the doctrine of precedent requires the same sort of
thing in a specific context, only more so-for it requires also the
consistency of action with judgment. If the doctrine of precedent
added only that last bit to the requirement of consistency, it might
seem like straining a point to criticize the formal justice argument,
so construed. But the seemingly tight logic of the argument is in
fact an illusion.
There are two significant, nontrivial, apparently unbridgeable
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gaps within the argument. One concerns the most problematic implications of precedent on the historical model. The other concerns
the distinctive social character of the practice of judicial precedent.
Morally the most significant implication of a doctrine of precedent on the historical model is the notion that any departure from
the most inhumane, unjust, unconscionable precedent requires justification. This sort of doctrine holds that, if a court has attached
legal consequences to certain facts because it regards that as appropriate for legal purposes, then that judgment deserves some
measure of respect.
The constraint of moral consistency is parallel to this sort of
doctrine only if it has what we may call a conservative bias, as my
formulations were meant to suggest it has. But in fact it has no
such bias. That is because we are free to change our moral opinions
honestly. The constraint of consistency does not mean that we are
prohibited from modifying, qualifying, refining, or otherwise revising our moral judgments, including the standards we apply. We are
free to reject judgments that we made in the past, if they can no
longer be supported by the standards we now accept; indeed, we
are bound by the constraint of consistency to do so.
The absence of a conservative bias is not peculiar to this application of the constraint of consistency. It is pervasive. I cannot
be convicted of inconsistency just because I change my understanding of some aspect of the observable world about me or its
microstructure. Perhaps I should not change my views without
good reason. But consistency does not prevent me from acquiring
such reason, from either experience or a reappraisal of it.
So the conservative presuppositions of the present version of
the formal justice argument have no basis in the demands of consistency. The idea that one should go on as before, without qualification allowing for changes in one's honest views, is not a corollary
of the principle that like cases be treated alike, on the present
reading. Of course, it may be argued that the notion of treating
like cases alike is most properly understood in just such a way, as
incorporating a conservative bias. We should be willing to consider
such an argument. But we can find no basis for the idea either in
the "form" of principles of justice or in the bare requirement of
moral consistency. To assume the validity of a conservative bias
without some such supporting argument would amount in this context to begging the question at issue, which is whether, and if so
why, morally indefensible decisions should be accorded any measure of respect.
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This is not to argue against the idea that a defensible doctrine
of precedent might have a conservative bias; it is only to deny that
such a doctrine enjoys support from a noncircular version of the
formal justice argument. There may still be warrant for a conservative doctrine on the historical model, but that remains to be seen.
Even if we supposed that justice or consistency somehow required such deference to past judgment, regardless of its flaws,
there would remain another substantial gap within the formal justice argument. Judicial practices vary, but any doctrine of precedent requires that a court take into account decisions made by
other courts-not merely superior courts within the same jurisdiction, for deferring to their judgment involves respect for authority
within a hierarchy, and not merely precedent. No doctrine of precedent is limited to prior decisions rendered by the same judge.
But the rational constraint of consistency does not require
that we agree-that I bring my judgments into conformity with
yours or that you bring yours into line with mine. Neither your nor
my judgments can be faulted as incoherent on the ground that we
fail to agree. The constraint applies to each individual's judgments
and beliefs, not to all beliefs taken collectively.
A doctrine of precedent based on the constraint of consistency
thus would concern only the decisions of each judge separately.
Even if we assumed that consistency involved a conservative bias,
it would require only that a judge follow the paths that she herself
has already laid down, not that she take note of signposts erected
by others.
There is, finally, the complication that doctrines of precedent
apply most directly to the decisions that are rendered by courts,
and that courts can have more than one member. It is unclear how
a constraint of individual consistency in moral judgment would apply within that context. But even if we personified courts so that
the constraint applied directly to them, that still would not make
it incumbent on any court to respect decisions rendered by other
courts.
More than the mere idea that like cases should be treated
alike is required, then, to ground such a doctrine of judicial precedent. It might be suggested, however, that our mistake has been to
focus on the historical model, with its conservative bias, when the
normative model for the practice of precedent is available. For the
normative model, it might be held, accords with the constraint of
moral consistency. That is because a normative doctrine of precedent holds that past decisions should be followed only if they can
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be justified, and just when, other things being equal, the standards
that provide the best justifications for such precedents are applicable to the current case to be decided. To accord best with the constraint of moral consistency, we must not understand justification
here in narrow legalistic terms, which often would be of little use
anyway, but must be prepared to apply standards that are sufficiently independent of the law as to be usable in its appraisal.
The trouble with this suggestion is that it does not enable the
formal justice argument to do any real work. It seems sound in
claiming that a normative practice of precedent would accord with
the constraint of moral consistency, because a judge so deciding
cases would embrace only standards she could honestly accept and
respect only decisions she could justify under those standards. But
this is not to say that such a practice is required by the constraint
of consistency, which is what must be true if the formal justice
argument, so construed, is to make any difference here. For that to
be the case, any alternative judicial practice must violate the constraint of moral consistency either directly or indirectly. But this
means either that any alternative judicial practice is in itself incoherent, or else that it could not be justified within a self-consistent
set of values. We have absolutely no reason to reach that conclusion. True enough, we have insufficient reason to believe that a justifiable practice of precedent would include a conservative bias, for
we need positive reason to believe that a justifiable practice would
respect unjustifiable decisions. But that possibility is, as we have
noted, no stranger than the idea that one might have to act when
principles conflict. We have no a priori reason to suppose that a
judicial practice of precedent with some conservative bias is itself
incoherent and cannot be justified, therefore we have no reason to
suppose that only a normative practice of precedent is justifiable.
A normative doctrine of precedent would not seem to violate the
constraint of moral consistency, but it seems so far to receive no
special support from it either.

V.

BEYOND THE FORMAL JUSTICE ARGUMENT

A fresh start seems needed, but only a few brief comments can
be offered here. We might ask, for example, whether a conservative
bias can be justified. Why should a practice of precedent be expected to show any measure of respect to bad as well as good
decisions?
The usual rationale for the practice, that it makes decisions
more predictable, provides, as we have seen, something of an an-
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swer, but its justificatory force remains unclear. The points we
have already made might be reinforced as follows. Not every frustrated expectation would seem to merit our concern. Not every instance, for example, is a matter of unfair surprise. This holds even
within the legislative realm. The grandson who murdered in anticipation of inheriting under his grandfather's will, which seemed assured by the language of the relevant statute, no doubt suffered
some frustration when he was denied those gains by the New York
Court of Appeals, 7 but it would be implausible to characterize such
surprise as unfair. This suggests that not every expectation encouraged by a judicial decision has an equal claim to our concern,
and that we should be suspicious of rationales for the practice of
precedent that fail to discriminate accordingly. The perpetuation
of an unjust precedent is, in effect, the commission of an injustice
to yet another party, whereas the failure to perpetuate an unjust
precedent may visit no unfair disadvantage on the party who otherwise would have won.
One might object that all expectations encouraged by judicial
decisions deserve judicial consideration because the decisions on
which they are based embody a commitment to decide subsequent
cases in the same way. One might go further: the judicial commitment to follow the same rule thereafter can account for the distinction between ordinary and "legitimate" expectations. Expectations
that have been thus encouraged by courts are made legitimate in
that way, and legitimate expectations are precisely those we have
an obligation to respect.
The point is well taken, but still it must be qualified. Our basic question is whether any practice of precedent-a practice that
would involve just the sort of commitment in question-can be justified, and if so whether it would involve a commitment to respect
all past decisions, regardless of their merits, other things being
equal. The argument that expectations established by such a commitment have a valid claim to judicial concern gives us no reason
to believe that such commitments should be made. 'Furthermore,
there may be limits to the binding force of such commitments,
whether we like it or not. Just as agreements can be void ab initio
in the eyes of the law, I would argue that the same applies to some
commitments from a moral point of view." We cannot assume,
therefore, that judicial commitments to follow precedents have
7.
8.

Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
See D. LYONS, supra note 3, at 84-85.
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proper application when the precedential decisions themselves
were unjustly decided.
If a conservative bias is to be defended in a practice of precedent, the most promising line of argument may be this. Suppose
that a practice of precedent can be justified, initially within limits
suggested by the occasional need for judicial rule-making. Two
considerations, perhaps among others, would seem to argue for a
judicial policy of respecting precedents generally, rather than one
that calls for an attempt to differentiate the desirable from the undesirable precedents. It may be argued, first, that within a system
like ours, with a doctrine of judicial deference to legislation emerging from a popularly elected legislature, it is appropriate for courts
to minimize apparent changes in the law they are charged with administering. It may also be argued, secondly, that a policy encouraging courts to pick and choose among precedents, in order to ensure that only acceptable ones be followed, is at worst
counterproductive and at best ineffective. Such arguments require,
however, considerable elaboration and substantiation, which is precisely the sort of effort it is my overriding purpose to encourage.

